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Summary findings
Arguments  for financing infrastructure  development  informational  and contractual  preconditions  for efficient
through  gr  :rnment  subsidies and  foreign borrowing  private or commercial  finance of infrastructure  projects
meet with increasing skepticism.  Numerous  "white  prevailed. In somc regions, it was difficult to tap
elephants"  subsidized by governments  have strengthened  investors at home or abroad.  Many  countries lacked the
doubts  about the cfficacy of public finance, and  the debt-  private  institutions  (such as universal banks) and public
servicing problems  of the 1980s have weakened  ones (such as regulatory  agencies) needed to facilitate
arguments  for foreign borrowing.  monitoring,  to discipline management, and  to ensure  an
Recent innovative  suggestions for financing  adequate flow of information  to investors.
infrastructure  investments  in developing  countries  have a  Irn  places as diverse as Canada,  India, Spain, and the
back-to-the-future  quality.  At the heart  of the nineteenth-  United States, getting enough  finance often required  that
century debate  on financing infrastructure  development  the government  provide collateral  (land grants)  and bond
- especially railways - lay certain concepts:  relying on  guarantees  - especially where  asymmetric information
private finance, encouraging  the growth  of domestic  caused credit rationing.
financial markets, and  choosing financial instruments  The main lesson: Exploiting  nontraditional  approaches
that  minimize the risk of dependence  on foreign funds.  to financing infrastructure  investment requires  acdon  on
Eichengreen reviews the historical  record in an attempt  two fronts:  liberalizing and developing  domestic  financial
to glean lessons for developing  countries  today.  markets,  and reforming  administrative  mechanisms  that
In the nineteenth  century, much  as in many of today's  ensure accountability  from enterprises  enjoying
less developed  and  less liberalized economies,  not all the  government  subsidies or guarantees.
This paper - a product of the Office of the Vice President, Dceclopment Economics - is one in a scries of background papers
prepared for World Development Report 1994 on infrastructure. Copies  of this paperarc available  free from the World Bank, 18  18
H StreetNW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact the World Development Report office, roomT7-101, extension 31393 (48
pages). November 1994.
The Policy Resarch Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the fsndings  of uork in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development  isses. An objective  of the series  ss  toget the fidngs  out quickly,  even if the presentations  are ess  than  fuily polished.  The
papers  carry the names  of the authors  and should be used and cited accordingly.  The fndings, inetrprerarions,  and conclusions  are the
authors'  own  and should not be attributed to the World  Bank,  its Executive  Board of Directors,  or  any of its member  countries.
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in Developing  Countries
Lessons from the Railway  Age
Barry Eicbengreen
Department of Economics
University of California at Berkeley
Prepared  as a backgound paper  forthe World  Bank's WorldDevelopmentReport  1994 on  infrastructure
issues in developing  countries. I thank Ashoka Mody for guidance and Lisa Ortiz and Andrea Cu for
research assistance.For low-income countres,  infrastructure investments have the most allurng  benefits
but also the most prohibitive costs.  Where transoon,  communication, and power
generation are least adequate, their provision can do the most to boost productivity and
stimnate growth.  But where income and productvity are depressed by the inadequate
provision  of infrastructure,  the financial  resources  needed  to undewrite infrastructure
investments are the most difficult to mobilize.  With the lack of infastructure  limiting
finance  and the lack of finance  limitng infastructure  investment,  countres can find
themselves in a low-level equilibrium trap from which it is difficult to escape.
Two obvious possibilities for break out of this trap are government subsidies and
foregn  borrowing.  When the social returns to investnent exceed private returns, subsidies
can be justified on efficiency grounds.  The classic efficiency argument for subsidies applies
if a bit of in  re  investment increases prductivity  and profitabilit,  iiting  a process
of self-sustained  growth only a fraction of whose benefits are captured by those who finance
the initial investment. Even if the returns are appropriable, investment may still not pay
when the cost of domestic funds is high, because the supply of savings is low or domestic
capital marlkts are imperfect.  Investors  may then seek finance abroad where its cost is
lower.  Where all  ihese  conditions apply government guarantees and foreip  finance will be
the norm.
These familia  arguments for government intervention and foreign borrowing have
met with growing skepticism  in recent years.  The -white elephants- subsidized by
governments have underscored doubts about the efficacy of public finance.  The debt-
I~sevicing difficulties  experenced  by developing  countries  in the 1980s  have  raised  questions
about the desirability  of extenal bonrowing. Both observations  encourage  proposals  to
commercialize  and privaie  infastructure initiatves and to fund  them by encougng  the
deelopment of domestc financial  markets.
There is nothing  new  about either  these arguments  or these  reservations.
Ifrstructur  projects  were pnvately financed  and privately  constucted in virtually  all the
regons that began  to develop  in the wake  of Eumpean  industialization  in the 19th  century.
(The  relaively modest  contribution  of the fedeal goverment to public works is illustrated
for the post-Civil  War U.S. in table 1.)  At the same time, government  subsidies  and
extenal finance  were integral  to the proces  of i  cture  investment. ln the United
States,  to take  a prominent  example,  early railway  lines were essentially  private
undertakigs.  But land grants and govemment  guarantees  subsidized  their constuction.
Finance  was raised abroad,  mainly  on the London  capital  markt  The cost  of many early
American  railways  exceeded  their  benefits  not just in the eady years  but in present-value
terms, causing  the debtors-indluding  the states  that had guranteed the bonds-to deult,
permanrenly  damaging  their creditworthiness.
The goal of this  paper is to elucidat the patters  of public intervention  and external
finance. Its premise  is that these patterns  are consequences  of the structal  characteristics  of
markets  in countries  in the early stages  of economic  development Government  itervention,
extenal finance  and subsequent  dfficuties are all corrlates of the financial  market
imperfections  that give rise to informational  asymmetry,  morl  hazard,  and adverse  selection,
while government  policies  to overcome  asymmetrc  information  can give rise to the problem
2Table 1.  Federal  public works  pdires  in the United States, 1866-1iS2
(in million  of dollars)
1866  1870  1875  1880  1882
Roads and canals  0.1  ..  0.1  0.1  0.1
Forts, armories,  and so on  2.2  1.3  1.4  0.3  0.4
Light  stations, and so on  1.4  2.6  2.9  2.4  2.4
Public  buildings  0.3  2.2  8.6  2.8  2.8
Rivers  and harbors  0.3  3.5  6.4  8.1  11.6
Total  $4.3  $9.6  $19.4  $13.8  17.3
Source:  Studensid  and Kroos, 1952,  p. 165.
Akelof and Romer (1993)  refer to as 'looting,- when  promoters  engage  in bauptcy  for
profit without  significant  shareholder  resistance.' Incomplete  information,  moral  hazard,
adverse  selection,  and looting  are not limited  to developig countries,  of course. But the
hioicl  evolution  of the present  high income  countries  and the parallels  between  their
situation  in the 19th  century  and that of developing  countres today suggest  that such
problems  are especially  prvasive during  the eady stages  of economic  development.
The remainder  of this paper  is organized  as follows. The first secdon  after the
introduction  introduces  some thoretical consideions  centering  on the interaction  between
informational  asmmetries, moral  hazard, and adverse  selection. These  factors,  it is shown,
can give rise to credit rationing  and account  for observed  differences  across countries  in the
structure  of investment  finance. The second  section  introduces  the financial  and economic
'  This is similar to de  problem of managemt  divers  of profits empaszd  by Jlen  and Mekn
(1976), although in the Aeldof-Ronmr modd it is  xacwbated  by reductiom  inseholdwr  mitng
imnentvew  cau  by the govemnt  gratee.
3environment  in which  firms  and governments  operated  during  the 19th century,  considering
both the nature of risks and the mechanisms  used to ameliorate  them. The fourth Section
descibes  the financial arrangements  that grew up in response.  Evidence is drawn from
expeiene  with infastructre  ivestnents  as diverse as turnpikes, canals and docks,
tramways, and electrical and lighting systems, though railways command center stage.  The
railways  were the most  prominent  and capital-intensive  infastructure investnents  of the 19th
century. They forged  unified  national  markets,  linked  domestc producers  to the expanding
world  economy,  facilitted the development  of modern  high-speed-throughput  production
tehniques, and provided  a hotbed  for the adoption  of modem  management  practices. For all
these reasons  they deserve  the promience they have  long attracted  in histones of economic
development3
The ffth and sixth secfions  consider  two devices  used  to subsidize  infrastructe
investmet to attract  foreign  finance:  the govemment  guantee  and te  land gnL  They
show how these worked  to relua the credit-atoning constrait but at the same  weakeed the
incentive  for creditos to monitor  managemez±  encouaging  the lamr to divert resources  into
unproductive  uses.  The seventh  and eighth  sections  consider  the implications  for growth  of
19th  century  infrastructure  investments,  distinging  social  from prive  returns. The last
section  draws out the lessons  for today's developig countres
2  Any attempt  to argue t  importance  of raiws  must confont  Fogs's  (1964) conclusion tat  the
social saving  due to rilway  constuctin  the U.S. wer  smimmL  Fog.'s  figmues  consder only socid
savings  due  to  fright  hage,  however,  neglecting  passeg  tffic.  And  given  diff  across
counties in geography and tpogrphy,  wblquet  studis  have yieded muhlr  etimatos  r otr
prts  of the world  Nor do soial  sv  p  callations  attempt to qafy  the dynamic dffc  emphszd  by
athors  as diverse - Jeak  (1944). Chadler  (1965) md Wlliaso  (1974).
4Theoretical  Considerations
According  to the Modigli-Miller  Theorem,  investors  should  be indifferent  about the
composition  of finance. If a firm is highly  leveraged  (it issues a high  rato  of debt to
equit,  investors  can offset this by adjusting  the composition  of their own portfolios. In the
simplest  model,  the structure  of finance  is irrlevant to investment  decisions.
In the real world  there are several  reasons  why this strong  resut might  not apply,
bankruptcy  costs  being the most relevant  to this discussion.3  I  their presence,  the retuMs
to bond-  and shareholders  are asymmetically  distributed. The bondholder  cannot  ean  me
than the rate of return specified  in the bond covenant  but may earn less in the event  of
de-faUlt. 4 iES  retU  is trncated upward. The equity  holder  cannot  lose more than his
stake  (assumig lmid  liability)  but stands  to make  large prfits  in the event  of a positive
outcome. His return is truncated  downward. The riskier  a pr*ect, the higher  the probability
of bankruptcy  and subnormal  retuns for bondholders,  and the highe the probabiity of
excess  profits and super-normal  retns  for equity  holders.5
In the absence  of symmetric  information,  then, the interests  of bond and equity
holders  diverge,  and they may find it difficult  to conclude  a mutually-Acceptable  contra
Assume,  for example,  that the  prene r knows  the probability  of filure but that
3  See Kaon  (1979)  and  Stiglitz  md  Weis (1981). Tax  offecte  the other  proi.t  mso  why  do
ModiMlil-Mer  Theorem  might  not hold.
4 This sta  t  goreg  capital - due to Changes  I  interest ratls econoMYwid and po  asid
incases  i  bond  prices  due to pior feirs or occrrce  of deaIlt
T  This  aSSue  a gin  expcted rate  of retupurchase  of his debt do not.  As long as all projects  yield the same  aeectd  return and
investors  are risk neutral,  entrepreneurs  with riskier  projects  will be willing  to pay more for
a loan.'  Since  information  is asymmetric,  adverse  sdecdon arises: as the interest  rat  ris,
entrepreneurs  with safer projects  drop out of the pool of potential  borrowers. Moral hazrd
results, because  by raising the interest  rate the lender  encourages  the borrower  to undertake
risky  vestments. Increasing  the intest  rate may therefore  reduce  the lender's expected
retun.  Asymmetric  information  thus  makes  it optimal  for lenders  to ration credit
In this model,  credit  ratoning is an increasing  function  of the riskiness  of the
underlying  environment  and the severty of balmes to the dissmination of informtaion. The
greater the dispersion  of returns (the riskder  the environment),  the greater  the risk of
bankruptcy and the more likely  the compoion  of finance will matter.  In a world where
all retuns  are the same,  moral hazard and adverse selection cannot arise.  And tihe  more
costly  it is to sort projects  by probability lass (the greater the informational  asymmetries),
the more serous the problem  of adverse  sdlection  and moral  hazard. Many present-day
developing  countries  are prime candidates  on both grounds,  be  thir  volatile  economies
lack eff ctive financial  disclosure  requirements  and altemative  signalling  mechanisms. ITe
same was true of indust  g  countries  outside  of Europe  in the 19t century.
Asymmetric  informafon,  adverse  selecto,  and moral  hazard  force entrepreneurs
with risky but potentially  profitable  prqjes  to commit  their own wealth  by subscribing
6  Since  al pr4et  yield  the  - expected  ren,  risier prectsl  (which  yield  notfing  in  ta  evet of
filie)  yid  a hie  r  in the  evet of  uccea  Henc, in the evt  of succes  mteprus  wit
risie  projecb can afford to pay a higher interes rtt.
7  I continu  to assume a unir  expeed  rate of retun.
6shares. The grater  these problems,  the more shar  capital  will have  to be subscribed  before
debt finance  can be obtained.
De Menua  and Webb (1987)  have shown  that the level of investment  in this
equilibnum  will be socially  suboptimal.  In the first best equilibnru math  risk-neutral
investors,  all projects  with expected  returns equal  to the world  interest rate should  be
undertken  But some  of these projects  will not be financed  when  information  is distributed
asymmetrically. The first-best  equilibrium  can then be restored  if the government  provides
an interest subsidy.
An interest subsidy  or guarantee  can give rise to other  problems,  however. Though
extension  of a government  guarantee  can relax the credit constraint,  it will also remove  the
incentive  for bondholders  to monitor  firm performance. This perits  mt  to divert
resources  to nonproductive  uses from which  it benefits, (Jensen  and Meckling, 1976). In the
extreme,  promoters  have  an icentive to engage  in bankruptcy  for profit.  As Akerlof  and
Romer (1993)  show, in the presence  of permissive  public sector  supervison  promoters  will
inflate  accounting  rates of retUrn  rlative to economic  urs,  diverting  the enerprise's
resources  into their own pockets. If bankrptcy results, govenment, and ultmately, the
taxpayer  will be left holding  the bag. This problem  will be most prevalent  where
govemment  overght  is lax and where  promoters  and their confedates  attach  least  value to
reputational  capital.
7The Environment for 19th Century Infrastructure Investment
Infrastructure  investment  in the developing  countries  involves  a considerable  element
of ris  This reflects four factors  common  to such settings:  the novelty  of the technology,
the relatively long gestaton period prior to reaping returns on investment, uncetain
prospects  for local market  growth,  and the lack of reputation  of aspiring  promoters. All four
problems  were severe  in the 19th  century.
Sources of Risk
Initially,  there were few places  other than England  to which  poential invtors  in
tr  e  projects  could turn for information  on required  outlays  and expected  retuns.
HEnce,  a sngle prominent  project  like the Erie Canal, so profitably  built by New York State
in the 1820s,  could have  a powerful  impact  on the operation  of the capital  market'  The
Erie's success  thus set off a canal-building  boom that engulfed  the mid-Adantic  and New
England  coasts.
Many of the technologies  involved  were new and unfamiliar. The costs of building  a
canal  connecting  Bufflo with take Erie or crossing  the rolling  English  countryside  provided
limited  guiance to those  seeking  to estimate  the costs of surmountmg  the higher mountans
of westen Pennsylvania. It is no coincidence,  then, that the canals  of Pennsyhlania  and
Maryland  turned  out to be more expensive  than anticpated and were never profitable.
Similarly,  information  gleaned  from experence  with canal  building  was of limited  use at the
S  The Canal  wa  completed  in 1525  at a total  coSt  of $11 million,  $3 million  of which  cne  from
curent source and $8 million  of whi  came  from long-tem loss.  It was able to mee current  inteest
paymnut on the debt  in itg first  year of operation  and was  paid  off fully  within  ten yea.
8outset of the railway age.9
Though  even  in Europe  only incomplete  information  was available  regarding
economic  conditions,  the problem  was most severn  in overseas  regions of recmt Eiuropean
setement.  For regions  like the North Ameican West  that had onily  rcentdy appeared  on
maps, not even  geography  could  be tkn  for granted:  one writer recalls  a dinner in London
where a British  investor  asked  an American  visitor whether  Cincinnati  or Ohio was the'  larger
city.
The amount  of traffic a railway  would  attact was contngent on the economic
development  of the adjoining  region, which  depended  on inponderables  such  as the fertility
of the soil, the reliability  of rainall, and the exotent  of mineral  reserves. -Want of local
knowledge'  was cited in 1852  by the chairman  of the Madras Company  as an obstacle  to
atacting  exnal  finance  for railroad  building  in India.'° Wher  the volume  of traffic
ultimately  depended  on fte ectent of mineral  deposits,  uncertainty  about reserves  posed  a
fomidable risk; North Ameican railways  were built  or not built on the basis of crude
forects  of coal or silver  deposits. Where  land had to be setded, dleared,  and irrigated
before it could  be fanned, many years might  be required  before the picture  was claified.
Cnadian railway  building  peaked  in the final  decades  of the 19th  century  but significanty
stimulated  wheat  production  (and  rail traffic)  only in the second  decade  of the 20th
century.?' Even where setment  was no  at isue,  years might  have to pass before
'  It  war mimilarly  problematic  to extrpolte  from expeienc  with gas-hintinglmp  to detemine the
costs  ad benefits of  eleCtifiCAtioc.
0ocpherm  (1955,  Lp1SO).
A-nkli  (1980, p.260  adptwim).
9economic  activity  and the volume  of traffic responded. An Indian  official  in 1846  cited the
long gestation  perod before profits  could be expected  as a particular  impediment  to railway
investment'  2
Foreign  mvestors  could be discouraged  as well by uncertainty  about  political  stability.
The hesitncy of foeig  investors  to place ther fnds  in the United States  lingered  into the
1870s,  well after the conclusion  of the Amenican  Civil War.  The unfortunate  name  given to
the 1857  rebellion  in India ("the Mutiny') represented  a persistent  impedinto
borrowing.' 3
Along with the economic  prospects  of the project, it was necessary  to evaluate  the
promoter  undertaing it  Recently  settled, sparnzly  populated  areas were prme locations  for
fly-by-night  operators. Promoters  could strike sweedteart  deals with constructon  companes,
siphoning  off the resource of the project  and saddling  it with an insupportable  debt burden.
This danger  represented  a  lear impediment  to investment.
Mewas of  Reducing  Risk
An obvious  way of reducing  these  risks was to exploit  the informational  advantage
possessed  by local inrestors. Countries  with precious  industial and commercal development
could  possLbly  fmance  infrastructure  investment  through  a limted partnesip  of wealthy
reidents who were well informed  about  local prospects. Early tumnpies,  canals and
railrads  had modest  capal  requments  compared  with the long-disance  rail lines that
MsPhccn  (1980,  pp.  180-1  1).
"3  M  dcPheco  (1955,  p.lIC).
10would follow. A locally-based  limited  partnership  might  therefore  suffice  to raise the
requisite capital.
New England, the center  of American  textle manufactring and hence of Ameican
industry  in the early 19th  centuy, illustates the point. The growing  number  of small
industrial towns provided a fertle  field for short-haul railroads. 1 4 New England  was also
the center of American  commerce,  shipping,  and whaling. Important  Boston  traders
specialized  in the China  trade, through  which they learned  how to use entrepreneuridal  and
manageial tecnques  to overcome  long spans  of tie  and distance.' 5
Much New  England  railway  finance  was raised  in the same  way that the region
financed  its textile mill,  namely  by relying  on family,  fiends, and personal  contacts.
Where  contract  enfo  was problematic  and information  was diffilt  to verify
independenly,  the markets  made  beavy  use of such  links.'  Friends  and associates  would
vest their  confidence in iddual  finaniers  with reputations for honest dealing who
signalled tieir  commitment by putting their own funds at risk? 7 The danger of looting by
fly-by-night  opators  was corepondingly reduced.
The great majorty of early American  railway  shares  were subscribed  by relaively
sphisticated local manufcturs,  farmers, landowners,  bankers,  merchants,  and contractors.
Not only did these indivduals  have superor access to information,  but they stood  to benefit
14  Chandlr (1954, p.25S).
Johnson  and  Supple  (1967,  p.30).
16 For detais, ae Lamuxea  (1986).
17  Raidis  (1988,  p. 210). As  Jobnon  mnd  Supple  (1967,  p.338)  put  it, *investurt tened to be  a
cumulative  al  process  in  ma enviroment  lading  an impesonal  national  nwcyn  m  -ke
11the eteaites  associated  with ithe  constuction  of transporion  links."  Many  early
syndiates were led by textile  producers  seeking  roads that would  serve their mills and
Boston  merchants  loolkng  to railroads  as a link wuffi  the hinterland  market  and the Great
Las.
This model  was difficult  to generalize,  however,  because  the captal requirements  of
early nilways were more modest  than the  successors  and the funds  available  in New
England  ecceeded  those of other developing  regions,  which had to seek extrnal finance.
Railway  shares  and bonds  tended  to be traded  in distant  market before  such trade developed
in the liabilides  of manufcturing  and commercial  concemns.  Manuf  used more
eotic  technologies,  and commercial  undertkngs had less tangble forms  of capital
(receivables,  for example). This required  greater  sophistication  of investors. It was more
strightforward to compare  the costs  and quality  of raiload construction  taversing similar
terains than the intangible  informational  capital  of a mercantile  company. The railways
were thus among  the fist  enteprs  to access  eternal finance  on a significant  scale.  As
eary as the 1830s,  a number  of railway  lines  around  Philadelphia  and several  lines in
Virginia  and North Carolina  were able to market  bonds  in London.'  The pattern  perdsted:
as late as 1914  railway  bonds  accounted  for perhaps  half of all outstanding  foreign
investments  in the United States.2
Pai  (1984, p.156).
"  Bain  (1988, p.211).
Adler  (1970,  pp.l1-ll).
Woodruff  (1967,  p.119).
12In tem  of accessng external  funds, railroads  benefitted  from the fict that some  of
the  knowledge  needed  to evaluate  project  risk could  be tansferred across space.  External
finance  of British raiways  was rlatively well advanced;  the experience  of British  investoss
heped them to evalte  the  prospets  of Ameican lines.?
Notwithstanding  these  advantages,  extemral  investors  were sill  andicad  by
incomplete  information? This  led them to shun  common  shares. Prior to the 1850s
foreign investors underwrote U.S.  railways primarily by purchaing  government bonds that
were issued to hdp finance railway construction.  Only New Englanders invesdng in westem
and southern railways were inclined to purchase securites issued by the railways tbemselves.
Boston  began  in the 1840s  to invest  in the roads of the U.S. South  and West hrough
personal  contacts. Railroad  men comig to Boston  contated merchnts who had invested
previously  in local railroads. The promoters  invested  their own money,  signalling  their
commitment,  "and taked fiends and close  buiness acquaintances  into aling shara in
it.'2  Long-fl  relations between weter  promoters and Boston mercants  and between
the merchans and thir  personal  tacts  provided  a reliable  conduit  for information  about
investment  prects  and their promoters.
Luring  overseas  investors  required  , inrmediation of spedaizd  institutons  that
had grown  up in the London  market issue houses,  prvate banks, bill brokers, and financial
22skin  (1988,  p.22.
2  I  r  to  textndm  rter  thu  foumi*' investo  for two rasos.  Firt8, coutis  suckh  a  Chad
ad  India  whh  were not  idepmndet  rlid  n externa finace  rom &e colonial  cater,  Gre  Brita
Send,  lat  deveopig  regos  i  contnentul ec_  lk.  Wested  Undited  Ses  reiod  a  anoa
fiance, frm  alier  developing  regns  such s  New England
u  Nichols  Bildle and oder merchs  anld  banks.  plyed a similr  role i  Phbiadpb.  Candler
(1954,  p.259).
13investment  companies. (The  importance  of these  various  institutions  is summarized  in table
2.)  In the 1820s  and 1830s  Brtish investors  purchased  American  state securities  and canal
bonds  recommended  by Samuel  Gurney,  the Quaker  bill broker, and American  Joshua  Bates,
managing  partner  of Baring  Brothers  from 1825  to 1864. Ihe head  of a British investnent
banking  firm like Barings  would  only occaionally  visit the region  in which  the investment
took place but retained  an Ameican agent  to monitor  developments.  Here, too, peronal
contacts  mattered:  Barings  replaced  its furst  American  agent, T.W. Ward, with his son,
Samuel Gray Ward.
Table  2.  roportion  of Overseas  New  lhsues  lItrodued by the Main  Type.  of lisuing  H}ues, 1W70-194
Official  Totll
ad  wemi-  ov0a  Companis  anwunt
official  Private  Joit-stock  ban  and  vi  thir  Oher  insed
agenciets  banke  bank  bankss  nmi  (finiin)
1870-74  1.8  53.0  4.4  9.6  18.2  13.0  390.6
1875-79  14.5  36.5  0.8  24.7  13.0  10.5  149.2
1820-84  6.7  38.5  3.3  14.1  26.7  10.7  355.3
i8S-89  9.9  43.7  5.3  7.5  26.1  7.5  479.2
1890-94  10.4  46.4  9.0  8.8  19.6  5.8  349.6
1895-99  8.7  25.1  11.2  20.3  25.2  9.5  359.6
1900-04  27.4  19.2  17.8  14.4  16.7  4.5  258.2
1905.09  10.3  32.7  12.2  22.4  18.7  3.7  509.9
1910-14  8.3  35.2  17.4  18.8  17.5  2.8  783.8
1870-1914  9.8  37.2  10.3  15.4  20.5  6.8  -
Tota
amount
(u)355  1,354  371  562  746  248  3,636
a.  For exaalplc,  merchin bank=r
b.  Conqpising:  invsuent  trut  (£23n uUion); finance,  lund, aLnd  prapediy comies  (£18  nil  ion);  specid  purpose
syndicat  (Mi  mllIion); issuc hou  with  stDck exchane  connections  (222 miDlion); companics  a  ueir own
iBsuers (13nmiion);  and mnellaaeous  isuers  (fL31  nmilo).
Source:  Bsed  oc  a table prepard  by W.A.  Brown publshed  in 7h  Econovi  (November  20,  1937) and rprinted  in
Balough,  1947:  233.
The leading invesment houses spedcalid  in recommending  only the hihst  quality
foreign bonds.  To signal  their cotment  to this advice, they bought the same bonds for
14their own portfolios. Typically,  these were bonds  of roads  backd by ste  government
credit or bonds  that were partculary well known  and long established. Many  British
investors  limited  their purchases  to a few large eastern  companies  for which  infonnation
problems  regarding  western  companies  were least severe.?
Other  Europeans  (mainly  the French, Swiss,  and Germans)  invested  more widely  but
conducted  le  business  with European-based  intermediaris like Barngs, relyg  instead  on
American  investment  houses. Rather  than paing  them up with mstitutonal  partners  m the
home country  as the British  did, these Europeans  dispatched  to America  a representative  to
examine  the prospective  investment  in order to ascertain  e value of the securities.26  The
immigrnt community  fonned another  conduit  for information. Specialized  publicains  such
as The  Amerk  alrd  Jown  and Poor's  Mwwaf  tae Rairoads of the United  Sates
also provided  information  for investors. From the 1860s,  Brtish investors  organized
thmselves as the Council  of Foreign  Bondholders  and te  English  Associatin of Amidcan
Bond  and Shacholders to collect  information  on arrears and negotate  th  debtors.
Protective  or  ons  were established  also in France, Germany,  and Holland27
Though most American railway  bonds were sold privately, a sewndary market in
these securities had sprung up by the 1850s.  Increasingly investors turned their  attention
from bonds  to common  shares. Stocks  were not marketed  by the usual  issuing  agencies;  they
2  Adler (1970, p.66-67).
'  AdIer (1970, p-47).
2'  On the operations of the Council of Foeign  Bondholders, soe Eichgrc  and Portes  (1989).
Wiins  (1989) motes  that tie newspaper files of the Coumcil  include 25 volumes devoted to American
raiways
15had to be obtained from American railway offices in England or, more commonly, from
jobbers ancl  dealers who purchased blocks in the U.S. for sale in Europe.  itially, only the
most reputable issues were traded on the London Stock Exchange.  Their numbers grew
quickly, however.  The directors of the Exchange provided only a weak filter for dealing
with problems of asymmetdc infor'natioBn  "Before 1914 the Stock Exchange made no
attempt to restrict or control in any way the right to deal in any security, whether British or
foreign....it was in general more concemed with aementto  ensure a reasonably free
market in the securities than with the intrinsic merts  of the company or with the adequacy or
accuray  of the infonnation provided."22 The Exchange's ability to restrict entry was
himted by competition from provincial exchanges and outside brokers and bucket shops.
From the mid-1880s  The  Economist began to publish quotations for American rails not listed
on the London Exchange but nonetheless extensively traded.?
In addition to personal contacts and specialized investment brokers, foeign  investors
relied on the signal of  hiird-country  management  A substantial share of late 19th century
British investment in Lain  America was in enterprises controlled by Americans and
Canadians. North American investors faced the same risks as their Britsh  counterparts but,
enjoyed advantages of proximity especialy in the cases of Mexico and Panama (still officially
Colombia).  Prior U.S. and Candian  borrowing had established links with the London
market that could now be used to channel information from Latin Amenca back to Bntain.
Pidsh (1951, p.4).
Adler (1970, p.158).  Trading an other European exchanges  was active as well.  As  ealy  1875,
63 U.S. railway ises  were listed  on the Amstrdam  Exchange. Wilkins (1989, p.202).  U.S. railway
es  were also actively traded in Berlin, Paris, Geneva, Zurich, Basle, Brussel,  and Antwerp.
16The involvement  of Americans  and Canadians  with whom  British investors  had long-term
relationships  maximized  information  capital  and prevented  British foreign  investments  from
being looted. Bntish investors  took shares  in Canadian-controlled  public  utilities,  tramways,
and railways  throughout  the Westem  Hemisphere. On the eve of World  War I, Canadian-
controlled  enterprises  represented  more  than half of all British  portfolio  investment  in pnvate
industry  in Latin America  and nearly half of all British  public  utlity capital  invested
there. 30
Risk could remain  even where  information  was not a problem,  given the uncertain
prospects  of the regions of recent settlement. Large investors  could eimiate  the
unsystematic component of this risk by holding diversified portfolios of railway bonds.
British,  German,  Russian  and Canadian  insurance  companes, which invested  heavily  in U.S.
railway  bonds, could follow  this strategy. So could  English  and Scottish  commrcial banks,
many of which held substantial portfolios of American railway bonds,5'  Similar
oppornities  were offered  to smaller  investors  by investment  trust companies,  the equivalent
of modern mutual funds.  Most of the early trusts were unincorported.  Shares were
typically  issued  in £100 denominations.  The first investment  trust, the Foreign  and Colonial
Govemment  Trust established  in London  in 1868,  spawned  a number  of imitators. In 1873
its five tustees founded  the first trust company  devoted  solely  to investment  in American
railway  securits.  Some  tmsts followed  highly  conservative  investment  stategies, investig
exclusivelyn high grade bonds, while others  branched  into more speculative  activities  like
- Stoe (1977,  p.715).
31 See Goodbt  (1972).
17the underriting  business, floating railway securities themselves.
Patterns  f Infrsructure  fmuance
These institutional  structus,  superimposed on an environment  of asymmetrc
information,  yilded a predictable  pattern  of ifrastucture  finance. Not every piece of
infrastructe  was financed  in the same way, but the exepdons to the pattern and the
distinctive  features  of the proects with which  they were associated  yield useful information
on the operation  of contemporary  markets.
Early infruc  investments  were almost  always  financed  locally?' Residents
had the most complete  Imowledge  of local economic  prospects;  local finance,  by liniting
asymmetrc  information,  minimized  problems  of adverse  slection and moal hazard. Local
residents  had lonterm  riosips  with the promoters,  whose  reputatonat capital  would
have been  put at risk by looting.
Not surprisingly,  then, early New  England  railways  were financed  almost  entirely  out
of equity.? Significantly,  however,  these  projects  we  relatively  modest,  only connectig
Boston with Portsmouth or Providence.  A more ambitious railroad built in the late 1930s
and early 1940s,  the Westem  Railroad  linking  Boston  with Albany,  had 2000 stokholders,
more than half of whom  were located  in Boston. Only 17 percent  had 100 or more shares as
Plait (1984, p.128 audpwsim)  insists on his fict.
Johnson  and Supple (1967, p.36).
18of 1841.4 Anote  example  is the early Spanish  railways,  Which  wee  financed  domestcally
from the 14Os.  Although  foreign  financiers,  eneneurs,  and  gine  took part, te
major  share  of capital  was Spanish.35
The undedeveloped  state  of markets  could,  however,  pose an obstacle  to mobilizing
local finance. One  example  of the difficulties  presented  by imperfect  commodity  and capital
marbet was the attempt  to market  bonds  for the StL  Lawrece and Atlantic  Railway  in
Canada  in the 1840s. Some  of the Canadian  subscriptions  were paid in the form of pork and
eggs  for the sustenance  of construction  gangs, since  many farmers  lackd  cah.  Certain  early
U.S. railways  similarly  took subscriptions  in the form of labor and materials?
These  early railways  were short and cheap  and hence  had relatively  modest  capital
requirements. The transition  from turnpioes  to canals  and then to long-haul  railways  over
me made  it necessary  to raise more funds than could be mobilized  locally. Extemal finance
was not a substitute  for local finance;  rather, it was a supplement Locals  still needed  to put
up capital  as collaten!  ;n  order to mdicate  twilingness  to  put fteir money  where their
mouths  wer  Extenal invest  could  th  be assured  that those  in the best position  to
assess the needs  of the project  and monitor  its progress  and the actions  of its prmotes
would  in fact do so.
Externl  finance  for inftrastucte  investment  might  come from more advanced  areas
within  the same  country, as in the case of New England's  investments  in the U.S. South  and
34 To cona  the roed from the sate line to Albay,  the city of Albay  subscribed the  ei  capitl
dock, paying for it with city bonds  Johnson and Supple (1967, p.43).
's  Wais (1974, p.159).
Eastebrook and Aitkon (1961, p.297); Cleveanmd  and Powell (1912, p.30).
19West. Where  advanced  regions  did not exist and  e capital  requiremts  of the proect
exceeded  the resources  that could  be mobilized  elsewhere  in the country,  promoters  and
governments  engaged  in borrownng  overseas. Where  as the short, cheap  Spanish  railways  of
the 1840s  were heavily  financed  by local interests,  their more ambitious  successors,  such  as
the Norte and the M.Z.A., found  about half of their capital  in France.37
The financial  instruments  employed  varied  with economic  and geographical  distance.
Nearby lenders, such  as New  Englanders  lending  to the American  West, often  purchased
common  stock  because  personal  and business  contacts  provided  a reasonably  reliable  flow of
information. Some  of the short, inexpensively-built  lines of cental New York were able to
supplement  local subscnptions  with sales  of stock  in New York City. 3 A substantial  block
of shares in Canadas Welland  Canal, built in the late 1820s  and 1830s  to  ircumvent
Niagara  Fails and open Monteal to westen trade, was  .purchased  by a group of ivestors  in
New York State. This was the only Canadian  canal  which attracted  significant  foreign
investment;  prommity  to New York and the stae's  xperence wnth  the Eie  Canal  played  a
facilitating  role.'  British  investors  in American  railways,  whose  economic  distance  was
reduced  by institutions  such  as investnent houses  and stock  brokers, often  prefered  stock  as
welL40
3  Pla  (1984,  p.129).
3  Trading in these sres  played a central role in early development  of die New Yok  Stock ExchangeL
Chandler (1954, p.254).
3Ulnimately,  revenues  proved insufficient  to pay for mmienauce.  In 1837 the provincial goverment
took effective control of the canal and formal ownership  passed to it in 1841.
'  Estimatn  for  years  around  the end  of  Ihe  prewar  perod  nonethless  suggest  that  the  majority  of
Bnrti  investments  in Am  rails took the form of bonds.  See for example Lewis (1938), who suggests
tbat  the value of British holdings in bonds, aound  1914, was two and aneaf  times the value of shares.
20Otiers more typically  invested  in bonds, which  were less risky than the residual  claim
of common stock."  Ambitious infrastructure projects such as long-haul railways relied
primarily  on bonded  debt.  A very few railways,  for example  certain early southern  lines,
were able to issue stock, but these  relied on the municipal  guarantees  of cities  like Charleston
and Savannah.42  In the case of Spain,  foreign  investors  avoided  stock, despite  the fact it
was widely taAded  in Barcelona. Common  stock  represented  only 40 percent of Spanish
railway  capital  as of 1864.
American  railway  bonds  could run 30, 40, 50 or even 100 years to maturity. 0 They
were secured  by mortgages  on the raiiroad's property  or enjoyed  a government  guarantee.
Many  lines issued  bonds  that could  be converted  into stock  at te  holder's option. With
time, this "long-term  convertible  mortgage  bond' became  the standard  investment  vehicle  for
American  railways." According  to Adler (1970),  all but one of the Anerican railway
issues  that found  favor in London  before 1852  were convertible  bonds.
One of the extra risks faced  by foreign  investors  was that posed  by exchange  rate
fluctuatLons.  mlustrations  from the United States  occurred  in the suspension  priod  during
and immediately  following  its Civil War and in the 1890s,  when  doubts  about the stability  of
the dollar exchange  rate resurfaced. Latin American  countries xpienced  even  more
Other  contpoy  estimats put the ratio  n  high s nine to one. See Wi  (1989,  p.725).
4' Chndler (1954,  p.248).  As Jacob Schiffof  Kohn, Loeh  put dto  point in 1913, stoks go wrong
more  rquently  than bonda'  Cited in Wilkins (1989, p.725).
I  Chamdler  (1954,  p.250-251).  More infimation on govenmet  guarantees  folows in the  next
4  Wilcins  (1989, p.725).
Chandler  (19S4, p.250-251).
21frequent  bouts  of exchange  rate instability. A few well-established  railways  of tie eastern
United States, such  as the New York-Wilmington  lines  and the Pennsylvania  coal roads, were
able to issue sterling  bonds. Lower interest  could be offered  on those  bonds  because
exchange  risk was absent.Y Thus, once the Michigan  Centra had proven  its viability, it
was able to issue six percent sterling  bonds  rather than eight percent  convertible  bonds. 6
But this was feasible  only for railways  with steady  incomes  and ample reserves.
The problem  with relying  on bonds, as foreign  investors  in infrasucture project did
in the second half of the 19th  century,  was that, in tie prevailing environment of imperfect
information,  adverse  selection  and moral  hazard  incrased with  leverage. The portfolio  of
project contempling debt finance  grew riskier as the intrest rate rose.  Promoters  had an
incentive  to take on excessive  debt (to water their stock),  because  they stood  to make huge
profits through  leverage  if they succeeded  but could lose no more than thi  equity  stake  if
they failed.
Contemporaries  consequently  complained  that many  worthwhile  investment  projects
could  not raise exal  finance. This credit rationing  created  an obvious  argument  for
government  intervendon.
Govemmnm  Guarantea
'When great schemes  of public utility  are brought  before the country," wrote 7he
E7onomit in 1858, 'it is natural  that the Government  should  extend  its aid to such
<  Some  also issed  gold bonds,  inte  ad  pnncipl an wlich was  payabe n gold
Adr  (1970,  p.SS-56.
22enteprises."7  The prei  was that the social  benefits  of such  project might  exceed  the
private  returns.A Promoters  employed  this argument  to their advantage,  emphsizing the
benefits  to society  at would result from the successif completion  of such  investments.
In the case of infrastructure  investments,  government  aid took the form of outight
subsidies  and aid in ldnd (often  fianced by the issue of bonds  daignated for the pupose or
the earmarling  of revenues)  and guarntees of interest  on bonded  debtY  In Spain, the
railways  received  subventions  from the government  as wel as tax ecemptions  and trff
ConlcCSls  on imported raiL  Canaian govermments  borwed  $20 million for canal
purposes  in the 1840s  alone.'  In the United States,  of the US$195  million  allocated to
canal  construction  between  1815  and 1860,  US$121  was spent  by state govenments, only
$74 million by private companies 5 l  State and local governments were also fundamentl
subscribers to the securities of the early Ameican railroads.  Prior to 1840 nearly all the
great est-west projects-both railways  and canals-were financed  by public  bonds. In the
case of the Western  Railroad  Corporation  of Massachusetts  in the I0s,  for example,  the
Commonwealth  of Mahus  took a one-third  partnrship in the railway,  which  k
finaced by floating  state  paper in London.'  The State of Ohio subscribed  one share in its
state's railroads  for every two shares  purchased  by private  investors. The costs of these
47  Cited in M 1 &nJs  (1955, p.181).
s'  I report some of the evidnce  asn  priva  and soda  rn:tu  below.
4  Anoter  form of aubaidy, the land gran,  in the subject of the next macdon.
:e  Jm  (1938, p.204).
£  Crsmner  (1960, p.558).
8  Plait  (194,  p.156).
23projects were said to be too great and their profits too uncertain to attct  adeqate  private
capital.'  Only thie  early North-South  railways and the Pennsylvania  coal roads were paid
for largely by bonds of private coxporations. These lines were shorter and cheaper to build
and more certain of regular traffic.
Subsequent  investigations  are consistent  with the view that railways trw  off positive
extenalities.  Fogel's (1960) study of the Union Pacific Rairoad in the United States, for
example, estimated  that the social return averaged 30 percent per annum, two and a half
times the private return.'  Yet it was far from clear that pnvate entrepreneurs were unable
to capture thcse exteralties.  Adjoining  lands whose productivity  and value were enhanced
by investment in a tunpike, canal, or railway could be and often were purchased  by the
pmmoter of the ifrstructure  project  Textile mills and mercantile  enterpises whose profits
were boosted by infrastructure  investments  that provded a steady supply of raw materials  to
the factory  and finished  products  to the market  could  be and oftn  were owned  by those  who
organized  infrastructure  projects. This  ability  to internalize  externalities  clearly  weakeed
the case for subsidization.
A second  justfication  for government  intervention  was to offset  information
asymmetries  and capital  market  imperfctions. Even  if social  retums could  in principle  be
captured  by investors,  incomplete  information  that resulted  in credit  rationing  might  prevent
them  from doing  so. Though  this rationale  receives  less attention  in the literature,  it
provides  an explanation  for the form taken  by many  subsidies:  interest  guarantees  on
5  Chandler  (1954,  p.249).
56 Fogel (1960,  p.106). I return  to this issue  of social  retuns in the section  an social  impact
24government  bonds. 55
This device  was prevalent  wherever  canal  and railway  construction  took  place. In
India,  for example,  if a company  did not attain  a minimum  rate of reurn (about  five percent,
at the time)  it received  compensation  for the difference  from the Govemment  of India  under
the terms  of "the guarantee." The interest  clause  in the bond covenant  was backed  by the
govemment's  full  powers  of taxation. All of India's  early railways,  including  the important
lines  running  inland  from the pOrt  cities,  were built under  the guarantee. The less certain  the
local economic  prospects,  the more  powerful  the effects;  government  guarantees  were
therefore  particularly  effective  in attacting foreign  investors. The motives  of the British
investors  can be explained  almost  entrely in terms of the five percent  guarntee of interest
offered  by the Indian  Government,"  as one Indian  historian  concluded." Without  the
guarantee,  infrastructure  projects  were impossile to finance.? Once  the guarantee  was
provided,  however,  Indian  railways  had no difficulty  in accessing  the widest  possible  marlkt.
The Indian  bonds  bore interest  rates several  points  above  those  offered  on Brtish consols  and
were regarded  as perfectly  safe. Investors  included  conservative  widows,  banisters,
clergymen,  spinsters,  bankers,  and retired  army  officers.
In Canada,  canal  projects  in the first half of the 19th  century  received  government
M  If credt  rationg  was  he distortci,  then  s  intmmst  gaua  (or susdy-this  section)  was the
firt-best  fom  of intervenfios. If positive extenzalities  were the distordon, m conrst  there would  be no
argumet  for iterveng  in ways that might affect tie  fir's  capital str.
"  Miphbeson  (1955, p.180).
5  Because the North Bengal Company  was refsed  a guarantee,  it was unable to begin  constuctioa and
ali deposits  were  tmed  to shareholders.
25guarantes under  ffie  aegis  of the British  Colonial  Office?  Before  1849,  attemptS  to build
railways  in Canada  had foundered  as a result  of difficulties  in  aising  capital. That year the
leglature passed  a scheme  for govemment  guarantees  of interest  at a rate not over six
percent  on half  the bonds  of any rAilway  over  75 miles  in length,  provided  that half the
railway  had already  been  built.'  Once  the guarantee  was secred, Canadian  railways  were
able  for the first  time to attract significant  amounts  of foreg  finance,  mainly  through  the
participation  of a few large Boston  and New York  capitalists  already  experenced  in rilway
building  and management.
The Grand  Tunk Pacific,  in its fte  the single  laqest investent project  undertaken
in Canada,  mlustates  the financial  structue that  might  resuLt On the pairie secto  from
inmnipeg  to Wolf  Crek, Alberta,  the government  guatanteed  thr  percetnt  bonds  for first
mortgages  in the amount  of $13,000  a mile. On the remainder  it guaranteed  similar  bonds
for 75 percet  of the total construction  cost. Moreover,  for the fit  swen years  the
government  paid the intest  on the bonds  it guaranteed.' 0 The imporance  of guarantees
grew  with the cpital requm  ts of the project. Canada  later began  the construction  of not
one but three  transcontinental  ailways,  for which  considerable  amounts  of foreign  capital
were  imported  (see  tables  3 and 4); Glazebrook  (1938)  concluded  that not even  one could
have  been  built  without  govemment  garantees.
leaks (1938,  p.199).
s  Etebok  mud  Aitkca  (1961,  p.298).
*  For debits, we ANki  (1980).
26Table 3.  Disttibulion of Total Flow of Capital to Canada, 1900-1914, (millions  of dollams)
AR1  Grea  Unite  torw
countries  Bnitaia  Sutesw  countries
MeipFal  govew_  260  200  60  -
Rtairoads  767  670  S0  47
Jnduatrial  630  420  180  30
LandSId  finber  305  80  145  80
Mining  125  65  60  -
Insumnco  a2  32  50  -
Other  198  111  81  6
Totl  2,546  1,753  630  163
Source: Buckley 1955, p.90.
Table 4.  Gross Construction Outlays in Major Tansport  Mdds in Canada,  1901-1930
Period  R-ailways  Hlighways  Canals and harbors  Total
V*luo (milhons of dollars)
1901-05  124.3  3.3  32.1  159.7
1906-10  380.7  11.7  48.0  440.4
1911-15  537.4  38.5  93.7  669.6
1916-20  252.5  39.4  59.7  351.6
1921-25  253.2  100.4  109.8  463.4
1926-30  389.4  172.4  138.2  700.0
P}etage  distnrbution
1901-05  77.8  2.1  20.1  100.0
1906-10  86.4  2.7  10.1  100.0
1911-15  80.3  5.7  14.0  100.0
1916-20  71.8  11.2  16.9  100.0
1921-25  54.6  21.7  23.7  100.0
1926-30  55.5  24.6  19.7  100.0
Source Buckldy 1955, p.3 2.
27Government  guarantees  were not an unnitigated blessing. While they helped  railway
promoters surmount the problem of credit rationing  created by asymmetric  information,  they
also removed  the incentive  f.or  investors to monitor management  performance. Investors no
longer stood to lose-or  to lose as much-if  promoters  and their confedeates diverted
resources from productive  uses.  This gave the latter an obvious incentive to negotiate
sweetheart  deals with those responsible  for construction  and supply in order to channel  funds
into their own pockets.  Because  many infrastructure  projects were one of a kind, the
practice was readily disguised. Reasonable  costs of idiosyncmratic  projects like railway and
canal construction  are intnnsically  dificult to ascertin.  Many partners in such projects were
only tempoarily involved  and thus had little reason to be detered by potential damage  to
their reputations  as promoters. Meanwhile, only those ultimately  responsible for the
financial  liability-or  more precisely, their elected  reesentatives-had  an incentive to
monitor such activity. Guarantees  therefie  could (and did  give rise to lootng.
The prevalence of looting is difficult to verif,  given the problem of definitively
establishing  minimum  feaible constuction costs. Yet the correlation between cost inflation
and bond guarantees  for 19th century infstrucure  investment  is suggestive. Again,
Canada's Grand Trunk Railway  illustates fte point.  Reall  that the Canadian govement
guarnteed first mortgae  tree  percent bonds in the amount  of $13,000 a mile on the praiie
section  and that it guaranteed similar bonds for 75 percent of the total constrcon  cost on
the remainaer. Almost immediately  the company  found itself unable to pay interest on its
bonds.  To a large degree its problems  reflected "unanticipad  cost  of constuction.""
B  Eastbweok  and  Ait=  (1956,  p.309  and  passim).
28Contractors  pressed  for the construction  of new  links  to the railways  of New  York  and
Michigan  rather  thn  the use of existing  lines. In 1851  Czowski  and Company,  a contracting
fimn  run by former  directors  of railways  with  connections  to the Grand  Trunk, was  awarded
the contacts for the construction  of these lines. The contractors  received  their pay in cash,
mand  the indvidual  members  of the firm  realized  sizable  fortunes."2 In contrast,  British
contractors  who were  dealt  with  at arm's length  received  less generous  compensation.
Overall,  construction  costs  proved  much  higher  than  expected. Existng lines  were added  to
the network  for 'inflated' purchase  prices. Operating  e  ses in the first ten years  ranged
from 58 to 85 percent  of gross  receipts  instead  of the forecasted  40 percent  that was  tpical
of other  railways. All this  is consistent  with the predictions  of the Akerlof-Romer
model-that unlimited  govermnent  guarantees  extended  to relax  credit-rationing  constraints
weaken  the effectiLeness  of corporate  control  if they  are not accompanied  by effective  public
sectr oversight  and regulation.
Land Grants
Another  form  of govenment  intervention  was land grants. These  can be justified  on
exality  grounds;  ceding  adjoining  land  to railways  and canals  allowed  promoters  to
nternalze  many  of the positive  externalities  trown off  by their  investments.  An alternative
and arguably  more  accurate  interpretation  is that  land grants  corected capital  marlkt
imperfections  in the same  manner  as interest  guarantees.  They  provided  collateral  that  could
Eaebokand  Aid  (1965,  p.310).
29be used to back bonded  debt. Land grants were pticualy  attave  to governments  for
which  interest guarantees  implied  ffie  imposition  of hily  distortionary  taxes.
Bonds  baclkd by mortages on land had minimal  bankruptcy  costs compared  with
other bonds. Interest  and principal  owed  to the prmary creditors  could be paid off trough
land sales in the event  ta  the investment  project  failed. The loan was filly collatelized,
mitgating the problem  of moral  hazard  and adverse  selecdon  that otherwis give rise to
credit  rationing.' 3 This role of land gants is reflected  in the fact that the only American
railroads  that were able  to issue regular  bonds  as opposed  to convertible  issues  received  land
grants."  These secues  were issued  separately  from the other bonded  debt of the
enteprise.  Altematively,  receipts  from land sales  could be mortgaged,  as in the case of the
Atchison,  Topeka,  and Santa  Fe railroad, which  issued "land  income"  boads. This bacing
was especialy attrctive to foreig  investors  for whom  monitoing and information  gathering
was least practicaL
In principle,  the land gants offed  to railways  in North  America  and  lsewhere  were
strictly  limied m scope. Compared  to an unlimited  guarantee,  this should  have done less to
discourage  monitoring  by outside  investors. But railways  receiving  land grants that
subsequently  ran into diffculties  were often  extended  inteest guarantees  and other forms of
subsidization.  In practice,  then, the negative  side effects  of land grants were no less
pronounced  than those  of bond guarantees.
0 At least this was tre  of early mortgagp  bads.  Susquently  some  pwmost  isued  coiatmuI tru
mortgage  bonds  tat  were seued  not by real popety  but by the docks  and bonds of otls  compis.
See Bryant (1971) for detabs.
*  Adle  (1970, p.54-55).
30The land grant  policy  was taken  to an extreme  in North  Amenca. Approximately  150
million  acres of land was granted  to western  U.S. railways  between  1850  and 1870. The
policy  was di  nued in 1871  (coincidentally,  the same  year it was adopted  in Canada).
The Canadian  House  of Commons  described  land grants as a wray  of subsidizing ailway
constuction without  having  to rAise  the rate of taation.  (Defaults  on guaranteed  bonds  in
the 1850s  and 1860s  had led to a painful  drain  on govenmment  revenues.) Initially  land was
granted  in alternating  blocks  twenty  miles  deep  and six to twelve  miles  wide, one going to
the railroad, the next reserved  for ffie  government
Collateal was most  valuable  in places  with the least adequate  information  and the
greatest  potential  for moral  hazrd and adverse  selection. In India, for example,  the
govemor-geneal  recommended  in 1846  that the East ndian  Railway  Company  be given  land
and a capital  guarantee  for a railway  to rua from Calc  up the Ganges,  a venture  too
speculative  to be supported  by pnvate subscriptions  alone. Parliament  considered  the
question,  concluding  that if the East India  Company  was going  to give subsidies  to any
railway,  pref ence  should  be given  to one that would  benefit  cotton. After  months  of
discussion  it was decided to give land  and interest guarants  to severfal  Upal
lines."'5
The U.S. land grant  policy has been stued  in devil.  Fishlow  (1965)  esfimates  that
the land subsidy  amounted  to roughly  five  percent of total U.S. railroad  investment  during
1850-1880. Other  authors  (such  as Mecer,  1969, 1972)  come  up with smalle numbers.
If the land was used  to fully  colralim  a comparable  amount  of borrowing,  a
JPnk (1938, p.210).
31railway's  credit  constraint  would  be relaxed  only slightly. This conclusion  may  be
misleading,  however. Land  grants  were not uniformly  distributed  across  the rilways
constructed  in this period. They  were  concentrated  in the  period 1865-70  and were  received
disproportionately  by certain  roads,  including  the first transcontinental  lines, the kind  of risky
investments  that might  otherwise  have  found  it difficult  to secure  adequate  funding. Mercer
concludes  that many  land grants  were wasted;  they  were  given  to railroads th would  have
been  built  in any case. He bases  this presumption  on the finding  that the private  rate of
return  exceeded  the return  on alterative uses  of funds-hi other  words, at  the railways  still
would  have  wanted  to borrow  at the prevailing  rate. An asymmetric  information  perctive
casts  doubt  on this conclusion,  because  it implies  that some  railways  denied  land grants  might
not have  been  able  to access  external  finance  at any price.
Social Ipact
19th  centuy infiastructure  projects  dramatically  reduced  the costs of communication
and tanspor  (see  table  5).  The ontribution  of external  finance  to project  completion
varied according  to the wealth of the indigenous  populadon, the density of setlement, and
the ability  to mobilize  domestic  resources. In the United  Staes the majority  of infras
investment  was financed  from domestic  finds.  (Even  there,  foreign  investmt  could  be
important  for certin citical sectors,  such  as railroads,  as table  6 illustrates.)  In Africa,  at
the other  extreme,  the largest  share  was financed  exteally,  especially  for expensive  prects
such  as railroads.
32Table  S. Cot of Inland  Transport  in Selected  Countries,  1801-1960  (i  US  mnts  per daort  tonuzile)
United  United  Ausualia
Kingdom  Frnmco  Stat  (Now  South  Wales)  India  Japa
Road
1800-20  18-29  - 30-70  - - -
1830s  13-22  5-11  12-17  - 12  -
1860s  - - - 13'  (s)b  -
Early  l9th centz  s-r  24  (1.7-3.4)'  - - -
Rdaway
1850  (3-S)  2.2'  (4.1)9  - _  _
1880  2.4"  1.7  1.2  4.1  2.0'  -
1900  2.0  1.3  0.7  2.3  0.9  0.9
1920  2.2  1.2  1.1  1.4  0.8  1.0
1938  2.3  1.7"  1.0  2.0  1.0  0.7"
1950  2.2  2.1  1.3  1.6  1.0  0.8
1960  3.3  2.5  1.4  3.6  1.1  1.6"
Note:  Road and canal  figures  a  mosdly  approximate. Bracmts denote  incomplete  figures. Railway  figues
refer to averag receipts for goods  carded by rail and  are fiom the following  dates  onwards: UK 1820,
France  1850,  USA 1870, Australia  (New South  Wales) 1870,  india 1900,  Japan  1890.
1871  figure  'New York State  rilway.
b 1861-2 fig=ue  for Cotton  only  1885 figure
S  SeeWJ  acm  J 1874  fgure
-die  ACan  route, 1830-50  I lncrase  m 1938  pary  accouted for by  ew method  of
Yorksire  d Iancasbie  railways for 1852-3  193-7  fig
'1851 figure  A  proximate
Source:  Woodruff  1967, p.253.
In Asia, external finance was relatively small and unevenly distributed.  Certain
sparsely  populated  countries such as Malaya received  large amounts  of foreign investment
per capita, fincing  almost all of  iheir  infrastructure  out of foreign fund.  India, operating
under the guaantee, received  disportionate  quantities  of foreign  investment. Most castes had
a background  unfavorable  to financial  involvement;  hence Indians provided  relatively little
capital for these enterprises, concentratng instad  in small-scale  trading ventures.
33According  to data  cited by Woodruff  (1967),  on the eve  of World  War I wme  th-quarters
of recorded  investments  in India  had been  financed  by foreign  investors,  two-tirds of which
were devoted  to the railways.
34Table 6.  Estimates of Long-term Foreign Investment in the United States, 1853-1874 ($US miflions)
Governent  Privae Sector
Datw  Totdal  Podae  State  County/  Bank  Canal  Riroads  Isurance  Minig  Manufauing  Utilities  Other
city
1853  22.2  27.0  111.0  21.5  6.7  2.5  52.1  0.4  0.7  0.1  0.1
1854
1856  241.0  15.0  111.0  21.5  6.7  2.5  82.9  0.4  1.0
1859  40.0
1861, Jan.  444.0  100.0
1863  200.0
1864, Mar.  150.0
1865, Mar.  320.0
16S,  Jue
1866  600.0  350.0  *-150.0o  100.0
1867  486.0  IS0.0  21.0
1868  938.0  700.0  60.0  7  243.0  10.0  25.0




1974  1,500.  92.9  390.0
Souc:  Wikins  1989, p. 91.
35FoMign  investment  played  a smaller  role in China  and Japan. I  China  it was oncentratedin
British-owned  businesses,  mainly  trading  companies,  in tie Shanghai  area. Only  one-seventh  of Brits
funds  went into transport,  most of it was devoted  to shipping.  The French  contribution  to infrastructure
was more  important:  French  capital  financed  railways  connecting  French  Indo-China  with China  and
penetrating  into China's  inteior.  About  one-tird of foreig investment  in China  as of 1913  was
devoted to transportation. Japan was essenfially  cosed  off to foreign  investment  prior to 1900. Only
therafter did the government  begin  to float  bonds  on the London  markt to defay the cost of its wars
with  China  and Russia  and to help finance  public  utilities,  including  railroads.
Europan investment  in Afica was  driven  by strtegic as well as commercial  motives. ITe
fonmer,  eptomi  by the French-financed  Suez Canal, dominated  in North Africa, while the latter was
the driving force to the continent's south. There, Europan  money  financed railways and ports to open
up the interior,  with its diamonds  and gold, and to exploit  opportunities  for plantation  agcultue.
French  fimds,  attrsted by government  guarantees,  financed  the construction  of railways  and  porU  in
Tunisia,  Algeria,  and Morocco  (where  Spanish  money  was also  important).6"
Exena  funds  also  loomed  large in Austrlia and New  Zealand,  both bause  the counis  wer
sparsey populated  and because  the colonial  connection  helped  to overcome  information  problems  and
other  rsk  Bnrtsh  investors  financed rually all of New  Zealand's  pre-1913  pubLic  worls, including
the railway  and harbor  systems. Population  increased  more  rapidly  in Australia,  fcilitating some
domestic  fiance of pubLic  works. But much  infrastructre investment,  in railways,  ports, and urban
public  works,  was financed  through  borrowing  in London,  particularly  before  1850  and after 1880.
Recent  studies  of latin Ameica (for example,  Stone  1977)  have  produced  a deailed picture  of
I  A few  loans  wero  mised  directly  from  govenmet agencieasuc  dae  Caim del Depots. For
dtails, see  KEuak  (197).
36the  varied  infrstuture  projects  financed  out of foreign  funds. As of 1914,  some  two-irds  of
European  funds  had been used  to develop  infrastructure,  including  ports, harbors,  wharves,  and power
and water supplies. More  than t  -quartrs of Argentina's  extensive  railway  system was financed  by
foreign  funds,  for example. Like  that of the United  States,  the Latin  American  experience  disproves  the
idea that a current  colonial  connection  was needed  to secure  access  to overseas  funds. As one historian
wrote  in the 1960s,  T here are few major  public  works in Lain America  today  which  do not owe thdir
19th-  or early 20th-century  origins  to a decision  made  by one of the financial  houses  of London,  Pars,
Berlin,  Madrid,  or Lisbon."'>
All this paints  a pictre of foreign  infrastructure  investment  having  a favorable  influence  on
economic  development Analysis  would  not be complete,  however,  without  mentioning  negative  aspects
of the process.  a  g  Peronist  criticism  of Britsh railway  investments  in Argenfina,  Jenks
(1944)  wrote, 'The lines  were so located  that they did not facilitate  communication  between  interior
areas  except  by way  of Buenos  Aires. They  were operated  substantally  as unregulated  monopolies.
Railway  rates were high;  they were unresponsive  to local needs;  they discriminated  against  nascent  local
dustries  and ruined  existing  competitors.  lhey actively  opposed  highway  construon,  except  for
feeder  purposes. Employees  were indifferent  to passengers  and shipers.  There  was insufficient  rolling
stock  to handle  traffic  eipeditiously."
Such  critcisms were by no means  uncommon  elsewhere,  as demonsUaed  by Popult  complaints
about the stuchme  of U.S. feight rates in the 1880s  and 1890s. Arguably,  howver, these  problems
were more severe  where  foreign  fenance  was more  extensive  and entailed  foreign  control. Jenks
compares  the effects  of foreign  investment  in the growth  and operation  of railways  in the Unied States
l  Woodruff  (1967,  p.124).
37and Argenina.  In fte U.S., foreign  finance  merely  supplemented  domestic  funds. Foreign investors
rarely acquired  majonty sta  and operating  control." Railway  management  was highly  responsive  to
local economic  conditions. An efficient  and reliable  railway  system  facilited  the emergence  of mass-
production  manufactuig  techniques,  notably  including  moden methods  of inventory  control, in the late
19th  century.P But in Argentina,  foreign  finance  dominated,  British  control  of railways  was often
complete,  and management-down  to the stationmasters  and engineers-was almost  exclusively  English.
The design  and operation  of infrastructure  projects  was consequently  less responsive  to "local  needs."
Private Returns
The preceding  discussion  of the economic  effects  of foreign  investnent provides  no guidance  for
estimating  private  returns. Where  investment  in infrstructu  created  positive  externalities  that were not
easily  capured by investors,  private  returns could  fall short of social  benefits. Where opporunmities  for
price discrimination  and predaory pricing  were exploited  by foreign-owned  or foreign-controlled
enterprises in contrast,  private retuns to the investor  might  exceed  benefits  to ffte  recipient  country.
The qualitative  liteature on  reign investment  in the late 19th century  does  not speak  clearly  to
this question. It is replete  wit  tale  of filed  projects  and disastrous  investments-all cases  with low
returns on purchases  of common  stowc  A prototypical  case is the Canadian  Grand Trunk Railway,
The main exceptions  occuned in the wake of defult,  when representatives  of forign bodloldeas
migh  demand  effective contol of mmagemenL In addition, certain Briish  baning  hous  had  impornt
influenco  on  See Wilkins (1989, p.209, 218 andpassin),  who reports examples  such a  the
St. Lotis and Irn  Mountain Railroad, m which Barings acquired a lage  stake, promping Thomas Bauing  at
one point to go to te  TUnited  Sates in an efort  to chane  the company's mgement
*  For details,  see Chzndler  (1910).
38whose  financing  was described  in the section  on government  guarantees. Despite successive
reorganizations  extending  over the second  half of the 19th  century,  the Grnd  Trunk was not able to pay
a single  cent of interest either  on its common  stock  or on the preferred shares  into which the orginal
debentures  were converted  in 1862. By 1865  Grand  Trunk Shares  were selling  in London  at 22 percent
of par."7
Nor were defaults  and losses  on bonded  debt uncommon. "Many  American  rairoads had been
financed  almost  entrely by bond issues, and in consequence  had experenced great difficulty  in avoiding
bankruptcy  and receivership  during  periods  of low earnings.'7 1 Not even government  backing
guaranteed  security;  U.S. states that backed  bonds for financing  infrastructure  investments  defaulted  in
the 1830s  and 1840s. The same was true of French and German  loans  to the Greek and Turkish
governments  and of British  loans  to the City of Buenos  Aires, all undertaken  in part to fund
infastucture investments  (Fishlow,  1985).
The returns  on overseas  investments  have been studied  most systematically  for Great Britain.
(The  distribution  of British  overseas  investments  in 1913  is shown  in table 7.)  Edelstein  (1981)  tacks a
sample  of Brtish equities  and debentures  (bonds)  over the period 1870-1913. His sample  is comprsed
of first- and second-class  publicly  traded securities. He finds that Bntish foreign  and overseas  equity
investments  consistently  outpaid  equity  investments  in the same  sectors  domestically. Equity  investments
in Indian, atn  American  and U.S. railways  yielded a higher  return than British  investment  in domestic
railways. Investment  m foreign  and overseas  gas works consistently  yielded  a higher  return hn
investment  in gas companies  at home. After 1886  investment  in foreign  and overseas  telegraph  and
S  See  Jo  (1938,  p.202-203);  Easbbroo and Aike  (1961,  p.317).
Easterbrook  md Aitke (1961,  p.432).
39telphone companies  outpaid  investments  in compefing  domestic  companies. Retums on investment  in
forign and overseas  twnways outstripped  those on domestic  tram companies  after 1876. Much of this
diffeece  is plausibly attributable to the greater riskiness of foreign and overseas investment, as
Edelstein  demonstrates.  But for investors  able to diversify  away the unsystematic  risk  assciated with
pardcular  foreign  invesments (rough  reliance  on investment  tmsts, for example),  t  foreign  equity
premium  clearly sufficed.
Table  7. Brilish  Overseas  hnvstnemt  i. Publidy-isseud  Securifies,  Deemuber  1913
£millon  Percent
Goemmet  amd mmicipa  1,125.0  29.9
Dominion  and coltnia  govemnuIs  675.5  17.9
Foragp goverant  297.0  7.9
Oveuseau micipaliiies  152.5  4.1
Rawaya  1,531.0  40.6
Domio  amd  colonia xaaiwyw  306.4  8.1
Indian railways  140.8  3.7
United State  mailways  616.6  16.4
Other fbreig naifay  467.2  12.4
Oter  public utilities  185.1  5.0
Elctric liHt  and power  27.3  0.7
Gas and wateworks  29.2  0.8
Cans  ad  dock  7.1  0.2
Tramways  77.8  2.1
Telegpbs and tephon  43.7  1.2
Commerce  ad  induy  208.5  5.5
CoaL  imo and ted  35.2  0.9
Breweries  18.0  0.5
Other  conuercia and industra  155.3  4.1
RaW  Materas  388.5  10.3
Mines  m.2  7.2
Nitrat  11.7  0.3
Oil  40.6  1.1
Rubber  41.0  1.1
Tea  ad coffe  22.4  0.6
Bsm  and ince  317.1  8.4
Banks  72.9  1.9
Fi_ancial,  lad  amd  investmt  244.2  6.5
Mlilnenam  8.1  0.3
Total  3,763.3  100.0
Sowm  Thom  1967,  p. 1 4 .
40The behavior  of bond yields  was differeaL Returns  on Bntish and foreign  railway
bord yields  fluctuated  inversely  in tie manner  predictd by tihe  Kuznets  Cycle  long-swing
model. In one decade,  British  yields  exceeded  U.S., Canadian,  and Ladn American ailway
bond yields, while  in the next decade  the opposite  paUtn prevailed. Over the entire 1870-
1914  period, average  retuns on domestic  and foreign  bonds  appear  to have  been  quite
similar,  suggesting  a roughly  comparable  degree  of risk despite  variation  in timing  of events
affecting  yields. Only  Indian  bond yields  failed  to fit the pattern. The guarantee  against
default  was virtually  complete  in India, as was the ability  to arbitrage  agast  other  assets on
the London  capital  market. British  and Indian  railway  bond yields  consequently  fluctated in
tandem.
Thus, Edelstein's calculations  yield evidence of a reasonably efficient intnadonal
capital  marks, in which  investors  arbitaged between  altnative  assets  and demanded
compensation  for exeptional risks. None of his findings  are inconsistent  with the view that
investors  did this in the face  of information  costs  that gave  rise to adverse  secton  and
moral  hazard. These  problems  limited  the ability  of potential  borrowers  to raise fimds  on the
London  market  despite  the prevalence  of government  intervention.
Conclusions  and  fiplications  for Present-Day  Developing  Countries
Recent  suggestions  for innovative  solutions  to the problem  of financng infiatruct
investments  in deveoping  countes  have a back-to-the-futue  quality. Relyg  on pnvate
finance,  encouraging  the growth  of domestic  financial  markets  that could play a larger  role in
41infrastucu  investment,  and choosing  financial  instuments so as to minimize  the risks of
dependence  on foreign  funds-these ideas were at the heart of th  debate  over fnancing
infastructur  investments,  most notably  the railways,  in the 19th  centuy.  Thus, the
historal  record is replete with information  on both the  ircumstances  under which  such
innovations are workable and their limitatons.
In middle-income  developig countries,  these  methods  have much to recommend
them.  Formal  financial  markets  and prudential  regulation  are relatively  well advanced. The
i  on requirent  for efficient  use of private and commercial  finance  are
approximated  if not fully met. Private  iniiative, commercial  bond and equity  finance  by
public  agencies,  and limihts  on government  guarante  could deliver  at least some of fte
beefit  tumpeted by their advocates.
In less deveoped and less-liberli  economies,  in contrast,  not all the informational
and contrtua  pecodions  for efficient  private or commercial  finance  of in
projects  prvail.  As in regions of recent Euopean settlement  and elsewhere  in  atin
America,  Afiica and Asia a century  and more ago, it will be difficult  to mobilize  resources
by tappi  investors  at home and abroad. Private  insitutions (universal  banks, for exmple)
and public ones (such  as regulatoxy  agencies)  are needed  to  ure  an adequate  flow  of
infomation to investors,  to falitate  montring,  and to discipline  management;  these are not
yet in phlac  in many  developing  countres.  With time, financial  libetion  and policies  to
encourage  the gwwth of the formal  financial  sector  can help to overcome  these  problems.
But in the meantime,  the hope that all problems  of inftructure  fimance  can be dispatched
through  the adoption  of policies  friendly  to prvate and commercidal  inifiatives  must be
42dismissed as naive.
So the history of infrastructure investment in fte  19th cenuy  suggest.  In places
otherwise as different as the United States, Canada, Spain, and India, the informatonal
asymmeties charactenstic  of developing  financial  markets  hindered  efforts  to rely on pnvate
finance. Funds adequate  to underwrte the construction  of canals, railways  and ports could
not be mobilized  through  the operation  of private  financial  markets  alone, owing  to the
advers  selection and moral hazard resulting from asymmetric information.  This was tnie of
attempts  to access  domestic  and extemal  financial  markets  alie.  Obtaining  adequate  finance
required  government  intervention  in the form of the provision  of coNllatal  (and gants) and
bond guarantees. This was necessarily-and, in prnciple, desirbly-tbe  case in a situation
where asymmetic information  caused  credit ationing.
Then as now, however,  govenment intervention  could simply  replace  one set of
problems  with another. Access  to private markets  was restored  courtesy  of the government,
allowing  promoters  to seal sweethwart  deals  with cnstuio  compie  that left taxayers
holding  the bag.  Govemment  guarntees might  render  inlevant  the informai  probhlems
that hindered  investors' efforts  to evaluat the commercial  pospects of infatucture
projects, but they ditnot provide  effective  mechanisms  of public  adminis  to monitor  the
uses of external funds and protect the pubLic  interest.  Where govents  made kst
progress in solving these problems, undesrable outcomes ulimately  drove them to public
construction and opertio  of railways and other infastuc  rojects.
The message  for policymakers  is dear.  Exploiing  tditional  approaches  to
financing  infs  e  investment  requires  action on two fronts: initiatives  to libealize and
43develop  domestic  financial  markets,  and reforms  of administrative  mechanis  designed  to
ensure  the accounitability  of enterprises  subsidized  by or enjoying  guarantees  from the
government Neither  reform  will work in isolation  from the  other.
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